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Providing a stable testing environment for experimentation is a common goal of all Testbeds.  To 
date, few, if any, have supported research in high assurance multilevel security (MLS), cross 
domain enterprise services and emerging Information Assurance technologies envisioned for the 
Global Information Grid and similar complex distributed enterprise networks.   To facilitate this 
research, an MLS Testbed has been developed to support experimentation on, rapid prototyping 
of, and testing of the results of selected MLS technologies.  The MLS Testbed integrates a variety 
of multi-vendor equipment and software to simulate a realistic network with dynamic and 
collaborative operational needs.  This report describes the design of the MLS Testbed, the 
MYSEA MLS architecture and recent enhancements to the MYSEA software architecture to 
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1. Introduction 
 
The technical vision of the emerging net-centric Global Information Grid (GIG) [1] encompasses 
support for high assurance user and component authentication and multilevel security (MLS) as 
well as flexible, dynamic security policies.  The GIG is intended to address the inefficient 
exchange of information in current military and intelligence operations that utilize a variety of 
specialized (“stove-piped”) computing and communications systems while maintaining requisite 
security controls.  Secure information access problems are exacerbated by the need to share 
information from networks at different classifications and within multinational coalitions in 
dynamic, ad hoc situations.  MLS systems can support controlled sharing of information based 
on both its integrity and confidentiality attributes, and are applicable to non-military 
environments such as state and local governments, and large commercial enterprises.  
 
Another challenge that must be addressed in practical systems is the efficiency and user-driven 
requirement for access to commodity software familiar to many users, but which lacks 
robustness and meaningful security protections.  Without sufficient security measures and 
mechanisms, the realization of a useable and defensible information infrastructure may be only a 
chimera. 
 
The research and integration challenges of high assurance multilevel security with dynamic 
services provide the impetus for three synergistic research efforts:  the Monterey Security 
Architecture (MYSEA) project [2], the Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) project [3, 4] and 
the Dynamic Security Service (DSS) project.  The MLS Testbed provides a controlled 
environment to assess experimental results of these projects, explore other new technologies, 
showcase demonstration prototypes and support student research.  The MYSEA and DSS 
projects are more mature than the TCX project, and thus, current Testbed experiments are 
primarily MYSEA- and DSS-related.  
 
This report describes the design of the MLS Testbed, the MYSEA MLS architecture and some of 
the on-going MYSEA experiments.  The GIG vision anchors our research activities, but any 
extended, rapidly evolving enterprise with information assets having a range of value and 





Strong and secure authentication is an important IA enabler for the GIG vision [1]. High 
assurance Identification and Authentication (I&A) mechanisms afford a high level of confidence 
in accountability of participants and support single sign-on capabilities required in complex and 
dynamic environments.  High assurance I&A [5] requires users to have a positive connection to 
trusted system elements that provides confidence that neither the system nor the user is being 
spoofed. This connection is known as a trusted path.  
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MYSEA is a distributed operating environment capable of enforcing multilevel security policies 
while maintaining support for new and legacy applications and unmodified commodity client 
systems. The architecture supports protocols and equipment from a wide range of vendors as 
well as secure interaction with external classified networks. 
 
The purpose of the TCX project is to provide an openly distributed worked example of how high 
assurance trusted components can be constructed.  As a reference implementation, the TCX 
Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK) is being developed in accordance with the Common 
Criteria evaluation methodology [6] at Evaluation Assurance Level 7 (EAL 7).  It will also be in 
compliance with the EAL6+ Separation Kernel Protection Profile. [7] The LPSK will be used as 
the underlying trusted foundation for two trusted components used in MYSEA: the Trusted Path 
Extension (TPE) and Trusted Channel Module (TCM). The former will constitute a reference 
“trusted application” for the TCX project and is being constructed to be evaluatable at EAL6. 
 
Another key IA enabler for assured information sharing in the GIG is the dynamic security 
paradigm under which access control decisions are based on a number of factors, including: data 
sensitivity, security risks, and operational needs [1]. Our previous work in adaptive security [8] 
extended the traditional Quality of Service paradigm beyond just network and performance 
attributes to include security as a multidimensional resource that could be dynamically 
controlled.  By providing users and the underlying resource management mechanisms with 
control over levels of security service and associated resource usage, security could be 
transformed from a performance obstacle into a constructive network management tool.  For 
example, integration of network management and status detection functions with underlying 
security service modulation functions allows a distributed system to dynamically adapt its 
communication security posture to resource and policy changes.  The Dynamic Security Service 
(DSS) project is building on the previous work by exploring how dynamic modulation of 
security services can be integrated into an MLS environment and how those services can be 
expanded to support the sorts of flexible security policy envisioned for the GIG.   
 
3. Testbed Design 
 
The primary objective of the MLS Testbed is to provide an evolving research and development 
facility capable of supporting different research projects, including those of students and 
collaborators from other institutions.  Figure 1 is a notional diagram of the Testbed architecture.  
   
The MLS Testbed is comprised of several disconnected network “segments” and spans multiple 
physical locations.   The Demonstration Segment showcases the MYSEA distributed MLS 
environment as described below.   
 
The Development Segment consists of separate “mini-networks” that are used to explore new 
ideas or to develop rapid prototypes.  In contrast with the relatively static Demonstration 
Segment, the hardware and software configurations of the mini-networks are ephemeral and 
loosely managed, i.e., each mini-network is individually maintained by a lead researcher.  The 
mini-networks utilize the VMWare virtualization software to optimize equipment sharing. This 
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segment currently supports MYSEA-related Voice-over-IP and IPv6 research, the development 
of a functional prototype of the TCX LPSK, and other MLS experiments.   
    
Figure 1.  MYSEA MLS Testbed Architecture 
 
Similarly, the Student Research Segment consists of separate mini-networks that are assigned to 
Masters and Ph.D. students. The mini-networks supporting student research are typically smaller 
in scale and simpler in scope than those of the Development Segment.  Again, VMWare is used 
to minimize the hardware footprint of the experiments. 
 
As with all tests and experiments, control of configuration and environmental variables that 
could affect the outcome is important.  This requires a detailed record of the exact configuration 
of the Demonstration Segment, including topology, and versions of hardware, firmware and 
software.  A strict life cycle process has been in place to control the administration and operation 
of the Testbed since its inception.  Only authorized personnel are granted access to the Testbed, 
and only stable software releases may be installed on the Demonstration Segment. Before any 
hardware or software element is incorporated or upgraded, unit and regression testing verify that 
each element works properly. 
 
4. MYSEA Overview 
 
The MYSEA network architecture affords users the ability to securely access information across 
networks at different classifications using unmodified commodity applications.  In MYSEA, 
highly trustworthy MLS servers provide the locus of security policy enforcement, while highly 
trustworthy appliances, specifically the TPE and TCM, ensure unspoofable authentication of 
users and single level networks, respectively.  Other system components provide the users the 
ability to run unmodified office productivity tools and DoD applications, as illustrated in Figure 
2.  Although not shown as a LAN in Figure 2, the “white pipes” shown on the left of the MLS 
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servers constitute an MLS LAN wherein different sessions operating at different security levels 
can exist at a given time.  An instance of this network architecture is currently implemented in 
the Testbed’s Demonstration Segment. 
                                                                                                                                 
 
Figure 2.  Monterey Security Architecture 
 
  
The MYSEA MLS network architecture is designed to support:  
 
° Secure connections to classified networks 
° Use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and legacy hardware and software components 
° Use of open standards 
° Centralized security management 
° Use of adaptive security techniques to provide dynamic security services 
° Integration of high assurance multilevel security with existing sensitive networks 
° High assurance trusted communication channels to classified networks 
° Open interfaces to incorporate new technologies 
° Use of XML tags as security markings 
° Secure single sign-on across multiple MLS servers 
° Server cluster technologies 
° IPv6 in a multilevel context 
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A federation of MLS servers within the Testbed enforces a unified mandatory access control 
security policy based on the Bell and LaPadula [9] confidentiality policy and the Biba [10] 
integrity policy.  A challenging problem has been the lack of a high performance, easy-to-use, 
high assurance MLS server platform.  Several Unix-based MLS platforms such as SELinux, 
Trusted Solaris, Policy-Enhanced Linux [11], and Policy-Enhanced OpenBSD [12] were not 
considered due their lack of high assurance. The BAE XTS-400, a certified MLS platform [13], 
was selected as the underlying trusted foundation for the MYSEA server.  Although the XTS-
400 STOP OS (Version 6) provides higher assurance than the others, it does not provide an MLS 
network interface and TCP/IP stack, remote trusted path, remote file system, or remote 
interactive shell capability.  Therefore, the MYSEA project developed custom software (both 
trusted and untrusted) necessary to create a useable MLS LAN environment. New functionalities 
such as support for MLS network interfaces and IPsec-enabled TCP/IP stack have been 
announced for a future STOP OS release and we are studying these enhancements to determine if 
and how they can be effectively used in MYSEA. 
 
The Trusted Path Extension (TPE) device is responsible for providing a secure interface for user 
interaction with trusted services on the MLS server.  After a successful login and session level 
negotiation via the TPE, an MLS LAN user can use their client workstation to access data on the 
MLS server which is authorized for that level.  As enforced by the MLS server, MYSEA allows 
reading information that is at the same or lower in sensitivity than the negotiated session level.  
All information written will be labeled at the negotiated session level.  Similarly, the Trusted 
Channel Module (TCM) device is a trusted component responsible for providing secure 
identification of single level networks connected to the MLS server.   Users on these networks 
can only access data on the MLS server at the classification level of the single level network 
from which they are operating.   
 
The use of a single client workstation for cross-domain access provides a dramatic physical 
footprint reduction compared to other approaches.  However, without appropriate security 
measures, use of a single workstation magnifies the risk of information leakage between sessions 
at different security levels. In particular, residual information in memory or other internal 
components of the workstation allocated during a high session may not be properly purged prior 
to the reallocation of the reallocation of those resources during a low session.  To address these 
object reuse issues, the MYSEA approach is to use “stateless” clients.  All persistent user data 
and metadata associated with a session at a particular sensitivity level are stored on the MLS 
server at that sensitivity level rather than on the workstation.  To avoid object reuse, our current 
solution is to recycle power at the workstation whenever a transition to a less sensitive session 
takes place, and alternative techniques are the subject of ongoing research.  
 
The Tarantella Enterprise 3 servers on the single level networks, acting as application-level 
gateways, provide MLS LAN clients the ability to access remote server-based applications 
through a Java-enabled web browser.  The Tarantella server allows an authenticated user to 
interact with a remote application as if the application ran locally on the client.  Through the 
Tarantella virtual desktop (i.e., WebTop), the user can securely use proprietary applications on 
the simulated legacy networks, e.g., Word and PowerPoint.   
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The Oracle Collaboration Suite (OCS) provides a distributed application environment based on 
the emerging Service Oriented Architecture (SOA).  A user logged in at Secret can access 
services such as email and WebDAV file browser on the OCS server on the simulated Secret 
network.   We plan to continue to investigate the effective use of MLS technology in SOA-based 
environments. 
 
5. MYSEA Software Architecture 
 
The MYSEA software architecture is illustrated in Figure 3.  The MLS server, the TPE and the 
TCM consist of a high assurance computing foundation (diagonal shading), i.e., TCX LPSK and 
STOP OS, the Protected Communications Service (PCS) component and the DSS components 
(cross-hatched shading).  The PCS component provides IPsec-based protected communication 
channels between the TPE and server, and between the TCM and the server.  The DSS 
components implement a dynamic service management mechanism that can adjust to resource 
and policy changes thus adapting to changing operational needs and threats as envisioned for the 
GIG.   
 
The Trusted Path Service (TPS) and Trusted Path Application (TPA) components together 
enforce the identification and authentication supporting policy to ensure that only authorized 
users can gain access to the server.  The TPA affords the users unspoofable access to security-
critical services and is invoked via a Secure Attention Key.  The TPS component on the server 
handles user authentication and session negotiation functions.   Likewise, the Trusted Channel 
Service (TCS) and the Trusted Channel Application (TCA) components ensure that traffic 
between a single level network and the MLS server are properly labeled at the classification level 
of the particular network. 
 
 
Figure 3.  MYSEA Software Architecture 
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The Secure Session Service (SSS) component and the application protocol servers, e.g., HTPP 
server, are responsible for handling server application requests from the clients.  The SSS 
ensures that each request is associated with a valid user session prior to spawning the 
corresponding application server to process the application-specific functions. This prevents the 
indiscriminate launch of application services and ensures that all services are associated with the 
correct sensitivity level and user. Because the application servers run at the users’ session levels, 
they must rely on the SSS to perform network operations on its behalf.  The MLS server also 
includes a number of MLS-aware application services such as Wiki and email (SMTP, IMAP). 
 
Support has also been developed on the MLS server for a client to remotely execute a client 
application on the server.  This capability is necessary because certain clients may be configured 
to only run a browser locally.  Similar to the application servers, the Remote Application (RA) 
component, e.g., a TFTP client, runs at the user’s session level and depends on the Trusted 
Remote Session Service (TRSS) component to perform network operations on MLS interfaces 
on its behalf.  If a RA attempts to communicate with a remote server, the TRSS checks the 
security levels of the RA and the remote server to ensure that the MLS policy is not bypassed. 
 
6. MYSEA Demonstration Network 
 
The MYSEA demonstration network is an instantiation of the MYSEA architecture.  It resides in 
the Testbed’s Demonstration Segment and hosts a number of demonstrations that include popular 
desktop applications, e.g., the Microsoft Office suite, for providing access to data at different 
classification levels.  For example, a U.S. user on the MLS LAN can log in at a given security 
level from the same client workstation to view information stored on the MLS server that is at or 
below that level.  
 
A Linux-based functional prototype TPE is used while work is progressing on the TCX LPSK.   
The TCM is not yet incorporated in the demonstration, so simulated Secret and Coalition 
networks (shown in Figure 2) are separately connected to the MYSEA server via two single level 
network interfaces. Thus, instead of multiplexing these connections through a single MLS 
component, separate physical connections ensure isolation.  
 
Both Knoppix and Windows XP Embedded thin clients run on the client workstation.  
Preliminary performance measurements indicate no visible performance difference between 
these platforms for retrieving data (as measured by throughputs), either directly from the 
MYSEA server or indirectly from backend servers through Tarantella.  However, it takes 
somewhat longer for the Tarantella WebTop to initially come up on the Windows thin client. The 
Tarantella server software currently used in the Testbed requires a custom Java applet on the 
client, and thus, it is hypothesized that this behavior is a side effect of the Java Virtual Machine 
and Java applet initialization functions. 
 
The security services that currently are implemented in the demonstration can be grouped into 
four categories:  MLS services, single level services, transmission security services and 
controlled Internet access. 
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6.1   MLS Services 
The MYSEA server is currently configured to run an Apache-like (modified Apache) web server 
that supports WebDAV and Wiki services, and modified sendmail and imapd mail servers.  After 
a successful login to the MYSEA server at an authorized session level via a TPE-enabled client, 
a user on the MLS LAN can view web pages at the same or lower sensitivity level; use 
WebDAV to create, edit and manage files kept on the MLS data store; or access a policy-
constrained wiki.  The user can also exchange email with other users who are logged in at the 
same session level, and can read previously-received email from lower sensitivity levels.   
 
6.2   Single Level Services 
The following COTS applications have been tested and are being used in the demonstration via 
the Tarantella integrated portal interface: Microsoft Office (Word, PowerPoint, Excel, Access), 
Microsoft Project and Microsoft Outlook Express. 
 
The Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC) system, a battlefield situational 
awareness tool, demonstrates the ability to support mission-critical applications.  The C2PC 
REPEAT system simulates a Global Command and Control System (GCCS) server that 
generates tactical information.  The C2PC Gateway receives the stream of tracking data and 
relays it to the C2PC Clients, and also forwards track updates from the C2PC Clients to the 
GCCS server.  In the demonstration, the C2PC Client is a Windows application hosted on an 
MLS LAN client workstation, which displays the tactical map window. 
 
6.3   Transmission Security Services 
Two pairs of high assurance military network encryptors, TACLANEs, are used to simulate 
encrypted channels required for classified transmissions across a WAN, i.e., between the 
MYSEA controlled environment and the simulated Secret and Coalition networks.  In the 
unclassified Testbed environment, the TACLANE devices are keyed with unclassified test keys.  
Two pairs of Cisco IPsec VPN devices are also used for testing encrypted channels.   
 
6.4   Controlled Internet Access 
There are two ways that a user on the MLS LAN can access the Internet.  One is through a 
dedicated network interface on the MYSEA server operating at the lowest classification which is 
not shown in Figure 2; the other is through the Internet gateway in the simulated Unclassified 
network.  In both cases, the web server application running on the MYSEA server acts as a proxy 




N P S - C S - 0 8 - 0 1 0         T e s t b e d  f o r  H i g h  A s s u r a n c e  a n d  D y n a m i c  S e c u r i t y  
NPS                                                                                                                                                          CISR 9
7. Conclusion 
 
The design of the MLS Testbed was started in 2004 and has evolved to support a wide variety of 
services and applications.  The Testbed is divided into different segments to provide both a 
controlled environment to demonstrate mature research results such as those of the MYSEA 
project and an adaptive environment to conduct research and experimentation on emerging 
technologies and MLS solutions. 
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